WHAT make pro-democracy and social movements in Indonesia post-New Order are still being marginalised in politics and difficult to transform their mass power to gain authority and legitimacy? This is the central question that this short paper is trying to response to.
To find answers to such question is quite important considering, at least, two phenomena. Firstly is that after ten years reformasi and democratisation, the Indonesian politics is still dominated and the liberal democratisation is monopolised by the small groups of elites. The second, the elites’ monopoly and domination is seemingly become stronger from time to time, from election to election, despite the fact that some social movements and many pro-democracy activists have been trying to ‘go into politics’. Popular organisations, social movements, and pro-democracy activists in general are not able to influence politics.
In other words, the attempts to bring popular interests within democratic framework have been failed. Moreover, democracy in Indonesia fails to perform well institution to represent popular interests. It also means, therefore, the country still far from substantial democratisation – a democracy that should allow diverse actors both possibility and the capacity to make use of democratic rights and istitutions to promote their instrumental and democratic aims (Törnquist, 1999, 2004).
This paper will base its narrative on information gathered by Demos – an Indonesia research-oriented and advocacy NGO for democracy and human rights issues – that had conducted country-wide surveys in 2003/2004 and 2007. The surveys attempted to identify problems and options of democratisation in Indonesia. Results from both surveys strongly indicate the presence of elitist democracy and the marginalisation of the pro-democracy activists and more popular social movements in democratisation process.[1]
Data presentation and analysis will be framed by some key issues for the study of movement politics. The first three key issues are suggested by Törnquist (2002), which are (a) where in the political terrain the actors choose to work; (b) how people are mobilised into political movements and the political sphere; and (c) what issues and interests they promote and politicize.
Those key issues are related to the capacity of actors in their relation to institutions in the political fields. A primary source of capacity lies in a movement’s relations with key actors and institutions in the political field. It is common to highlight the importance of formal rights and institutions within the political system. Another source is found in a movement’s ability to mobilise individuals and groups in society. The third is movement’s ability to participate in the struggle over meaning regarding rights, issues, actors and policies (Stokke and Oldfield (2004) in Harriss, Stokke, Törnquist, 2004: 130-131).
In addition, it is also important to evaluate (d) what are the sources of power and (e) how the pro-democracy activists and social movements transform it into legitimacy and authority. These information are necessary to see the positions (defined by volume and composition of capital possessed by the occupants of different positions) and forces (defined by relations of domination, subordination or equivalence between different positions) within a field (Stokke and Oldfield (2004) in Harriss, Stokke, Törnquist, 2004: 130).
Findings from the surveys realted to those key issues are as follows.
Shifting the movement: From civil society to the state
When Demos carried out the first survey, in 2003-2004, there was strong indication that the pro-democracy organisations tend to avoid organised politics. They isolated themselves in civil society, making alliances and networking within their own milieu. They related very rare their activity in various spaces and actors within the state and also, even worse, in business.
The reluctance might expressed a general feelings of ‘dirty politics’, as similar with Harriss’ (2005) observation on India and Latin America civil societies. For many pro-democracy activists in Indonesia, doing politics were always understood as ‘old politics’, involve in political parties and becoming members of parliament. They felt that, as Harris indicated in the case of India, this kind of political participation “has failed to deliver solutions to many social problems, and appears fatally corrupted by struggles for state power and personal advantage”. (Harriss, 2005: 2)
The situation changed substantially three years later. The rpo-democracy and social movement activists have started to enter and to influence the executive and the legislative and have also entered the political parties. On the one hand, this may be seen as a positive development. As indicated from the 2003-2004 survey, to ignore the state institutions had limited the movements to a marginal and insignificant political role. Now, the activists will easier to influence politics as their presence in the arena increases. However, on the other hand, the phenomenon is in essence more of a shift rather than attempts to broaden their spheres. As a result, along with the escalating activities within the state institutions and political parties, their influence in civil society will decrease – a phenomenon that will lessen the positive effect in those spheres as their presence is not accompanied by any mandate strongly binding them to the civil society bases they previously established.
The increased intensity in the state domain is also confirmed by the map of alliances built by pro-democracy activists to influence the dynamics and to control the political process. They make alliances not only with other civil associations and some prominent informal pro-democratic figures but also with figures ingovernment institutions, bureaucrats, politicians and the members of parliament. This recent tendency seems parallel with the increasing their activity in organised politics. In addition, alliances are also built with informal and professional figures, such as academics, lawyers, and media.
Shortcut: Populism and become a new patron
Unfortunately, the pro-democracy activists are trapped by short-term and the narrow goals they have set for themselves, namely to contend for political positions. This is not wrong, but it creates problems as it is done undemocratically. Attempts to grab political positions are commonly individual-based and not as collective actions supported by a strict organisational mechanism that allowing for political accountability.
It might be that these actions are motivated by impatience but nonetheless the implication is that it worsens the situation of representation. Organisations’ bases tend to be established to serve temporary needs, sometimes as the result of an agreement among a number of popular figures while at the same time the movement leaders rise as new patrons. Eventually, they too fail to de-monopolise the dominant elites.
The fact that the activists and movement leaders tend to use populist methods is likely related to their capacity to use the means of democracy. It is true that the capacity to mobilise and organise people has increased, compared to the previous result. This capacity seems to be along the lines of methods usually applied by populists, such working through popular and charismatic leaders, alternative patronage, and building networks between independent actors.
However, improved capacity does not mean much when it fails to put organisations together at basic level. This shows that the pro-democrats and social movement activists lack the ability to organise the masses, given that they tend to work with people with similar interest and groups with religious or ethnic backgrounds rather than those with similar professions or interests or different ranks and structures and similarities of origin and domicile. In many cases, they go into politics without considering support from their basis.
Fragmentation in politicising issues and agenda
With regard to issues the actors fight for, some improvements were made by pro-democracy and movement activists by focusing on a single and specific issue. However, they tend to take up the issue of democracy and civil-political rights, good governance and anti-corruption and human rights. There is little emphasis on issues related to ‘bread and butter’, economic development etc. This is in sharp contrast to the powerful elites who manage to focus on the matters while also addressing governance issues, but remain disinterested in democratic related issues, such as human rights issues and popular democracy promotion.
It is also unfortunate that pro-democracy activists are unable to employ issues that are more local in nature and touch on the need and interests of the people, such issues related to public services, basic needs, social security, environment, sustainable development, local autonomy and decentralization.
In addition, it is also interesting to note that the powerful elites seem to be paying more attention to issues of macro-economic development than the movement activists. Partly, this may become an indication that powerful elites are more aware of the connection between their interests and the selection of macro-economic policies. The pro-democracy movement activists do not seem to care sufficiently about these issues.
It is likely that the activists regard economic development with less interest. Their capacity to employ issues in this category is less progressive than that of the powerful elites. The latter actors seem to be way ahead as they start to combine issues for which to fight.
Sources of power and attempts to gain legitimacy
Another important element related with the capacity of actors to promote meaningful democracy is their sources of power and the way to transform it. Both surveys suggest that pro-democracy and movement leaders have tended to rely on knowledge and information, social strength and favourable contacts. Their efforts to make use of economic resources or mass mobilisation are limited. Compared to the first survey in 2003-2004, the number of pro-democrats utilising these sources of power decline.
Taking part in producing knowledge and disseminating information, such as seminars and discussion forums, is therefore an alternative to the lack in the two above mentioned sources to gain legitimacy and authority. The establishment of networks and making contacts with powerful people is also central to serve the purpose. They are also gaining legitimacy through community organising by, particularly, prioritising economic independence.
This seems to relate to the background of the pro-dmocracy and social movement activists, who are rarely from a business background. Yet, if business is considered beyond their reach, there has been little awareness among them to transform alternative resources into main economical ones. In addition, the ability of the activists to demonstrate their mass based collective power remains poor.
The powerful elites are also supported by economic power and a well-oiled political machine. While on the other hand, the social movement activists still rely on their intellectuality and unorganised mass power. As a result, powerful elites tend not to be influenced by the movements’ efforts to change the status quo. The rich powerful elites can easily finance media campaigns and involve themselves in as many public issues as possible, including “democratic” issues, intervene in decision making processes and finally win them for their own personal interests.
Hence, the monopoly of powerful and dominant elites does not only become stronger but also is retained as much as possible by democratic ways. Their monopoly does not only apply to power but also to democracy.
Demos survey also clearly shows that lately the powerful elites have been using various democratic ways and channels to legitimate their power. The findings of the first survey (2003-2004) pointed to the use of coercive and corruptive ways by powerful elites to legitimate their power. Now, such ways are becoming outdated and replaced by dialogue, lobby to politicians and government officials, inter-personal contacts, networking and election participation.
Fragmented movement
The lack of political skill of popular organisations is related to floating mass policy and politics of alienation applied during New Order. Both policy had created, on the one hand, monopoly of sources of power by only small groups of elites, and, the other hand, an alienated society from politics. It also had limited popular organisations to have political experiences.
Data from Demos surveys show that the blame could no longer be put on the history. It is not only because of excessive authoritarianism and alienation during New Order. When the New Order regime felt down, there was actually an openly political opportunity to anyone. But the popular organisations and pro-democratic social movements ignored the opportunity just because their feeling of ‘dirty politics’. This tendency is more or less similar with Harriss’ (2005) observation on civil society in Latin America and India. Pro-democracy activists and social movements put attempts too much in efforts to build democracy only from below.
They sideline, if they do not altogether ignore the role of political society, including political parties that negotiate between and aggregate together different interests and values, and contend for the authority to make decisions on matters of public importance. (Harriss, Stokke, Törnquist (2004a) in Harriss, Stokke, Törnquist, 2004: 14).
It is true that political activists, in turn, may be elitist and lack of genuine bases on the ground, in civil society. But a major problem seems to be that of what Törnquist calls ‘pro-democratic fragmentation’, when there are insufficient links between civic and political acitivism, as well as divisive single issues, interests and identitites. (Harriss, Stokke, Törnquist (2004a) in Harriss, Stokke, Törnquist, 2004: 15).
However, civil society activists are now more anxious than before to legitimate their work in terms of whom they try to represent (Houtzager, 2007). Moreover, the new institutions for direct participation such as participatory planning are attempts to initiate a new layer of representation between electoral chains of popular sovereignty on the one hand and associational life and populism on the other. Yet, a number of questions remain to be answered such as how to guarantee authorisation and accountability, and even more difficult, how to identify and agree on what parts of the demos should control what sections of public affairs on the basis of political equality. (Törnquist, 2009a)
Conclusion
Studies of social movements have focused on why and how collective actions emerge, but have paid much less attention to movement politics and the political outcomes of collective action. In consequence, analyses have depicted much about the structural grievances and internal organisation of movements but less about the relational and contextual aspects that are central to understanding local political dynamics (Stokke and Oldfield (2004) in Harriss, Stokke, Törnquist, 2004: 128).
From data presentation of Demos survey and discussion, it is clear that fragmentation and organisational weaknesses are crucial problems to be faced by social movement and pro-democracy activists. These are major internal problems to be solved by the pro-democratic social movement activists.
The problem is even more complicated when it relates to the contextual situation of democratisation. Various inisiatives to go into ‘new politics’ are not enough to improve democracy because of both sectoral and geographically fragmentations. They need for merging issues/up-scaling their movement.
The attempts to go into politics are also driven by individual actions, not based on comprehensive organisational mechanism. These will not only prevent accountability between leaders and their constituent, but also can easily create an new patronise politics.
All political actors including social movement activists seem to be more accommodative and adaptive to democracy and to the process of democratisation. It is unfortunate that their democratic capacities are insufficient. The powerful actors employ their political and economical strength, while alternative actors have not yet succeeded to become democratic alternative forces. They even tend to individually and opportunistically pick a short-cut to gain political power, rather than organise basis as their democratic political source of power.
Finally, particularly regarding to civil association, democracy would be strengthened if NGOs combined their policy-making inputs from the base of a listening organisation that engaged with the marginalised, recruited a broad-based membership and allowed their membership full democratic participation in the organisation. By having a broad-based membership, the organisation also gives its members a major stake-holding in the organisation as well as encourages them to participate in democratic decision-making at an organisational-level.
For any organisations intent on strengthening democracy, this would be an extremely important step in a larger process of deepening democracy since the popular organisations and civil associations now become a kind of effective “training group” of practical democratic politics. Sure, to do this, co-operation with politicians and other actors in political society are necessary.
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References
Harriss, John (2005). ‘Politics is a dirty river’: but is there a ‘new politics’ of civil society? Perspectives form global cities of India and Latin America [online]. London: LSE Research Online.
Available at: http://eprints.lse.ac.uk/archive/00000487
Available online: November 2005.
Harriss, John, Kristian Stokke and Olle Törnquist (Eds.) (2004). Politicising Democracy. The New Local Politics of Democratisation. Houndmills: Palgrave.
Harriss, John, Kristian Stokke and Olle Törnquist (2004a). "Introduction: The New Local Politics of Democratisation" in Harriss, Stokke, Törnquist (Eds.) (2004).
Priyono, AE., Willy Purna Samadhi and Olle Törnquist (Eds.) (2007). Making Democracy Meaningful: Problems and Options in Indonesia. Jakarta-Yogyakarta: Demos-PCD Press.
Samadhi, Willy Purna and Nicolaas Warouw (eds.) (2009). Democracy-building On the Sand. Yogyakarta: PCD Press.
Stokke, K., and Sophie Oldfield (2004). “Social Movements, Socio-economic Rights and Substantial Democratisation in South Africa” in Harriss, Stokke, Törnquist (Eds.) (2004).
Törnquist, Olle (2004). “The Political Deficit of Substantial Democratisation" in Harriss, Stokke, Törnquist (Eds.) (2004).
Törnquist, Olle and Nicolaas Warouw (2009a). “Approaching Democracy: Some brief Introductory notes of concepts and methods”, in Samadhi and Warouw (eds.) (2009).
Törnquist, Webster and Stokke (Eds.) (forthcoming 2009b). Rethinking Popular Representation. Houndmills: Palgrave.
Törnquist, O. (forthcoming 2009c). "The problem is representation! Towards an analytical framework" in Törnquist, Webster and Stokke (Eds.) (forthcoming 2009).
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[1] For the full-report of Demos surveys, see Priyono, Samadhi, Törnquist (eds.) (2007) and Samadhi and Warouw (eds.) (2009).
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